In preparation of People's Health Assembly II - part 16
-------------------------------------------------------
More on MDGs:
STRATEGIZING THE END OF GLOBAL MALNUTRITION
George Kent
International agencies have taken to putting out "strategies" to
achieve many lofty goals. Examples include the World Health Or-
ganization's Global Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding,
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations'
strategy to enhance food security in Africa, and the World
Health Organization's Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity
and Health. Despite the fanfare, examination of the resulting
documents generally reveals vague goals, little commitment, un-
certain time frames, and soft recommendations. Serious strate-
gies should lead to serious expectation that specific goals will
be achieved in a well-defined time frame. Vague guidelines do
not constitute strategy.
The objective of the Millennium Project in relation to hunger is
clear:
The mandate of the Millennium Project's Hunger Task Force is to
produce a plan-what it takes-for humanity to reduce the propor-
tion of hungry and malnourished people in half by the year 2015
(Millennium Project Hunger Task Force 2003, 9).
The Task Force offered a "Review of Ongoing Strategies" for end-
ing hunger, beginning with the Plan of Action that came out of
the World Food Summit of 1996. The group could have gone more
deeply into past failures to address malnutrition on a global
scale, such as:
* The Manifesto of the Special Assembly on Man's Right to Free-
dom from Hunger, held in Rome in March 1963;
* the International Undertaking on World Food Security and the
Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutri-
tion, issued by the World Food Conference held in Rome in 1974;
* the Plan of Action on World Food Security of 1979;
* the Agenda for Consultations and Possible Action to deal with
Acute and Large-scale Food Shortages of 1981;
* the World Food Security Compact of 1985;
* the Plan of Action for Implementing the World Declaration on
the Survival, Protection, and Development of Children, issued by
the World Summit for Children held at the United Nations in New
York in September 1990, which included a major section on reduc-
ing children's malnutrition;
* the World Declaration and Plan of Action on Nutrition of the
International Conference on Nutrition held in Rome in December
1992.
There is much to be learned from all these experiences. How is
the current effort different?
One common thread in all these past efforts is that they focus
on country-level planning and action. What are the responsibili-
ties of the international community? What is the program of ac-
tion that the richer countries of the world and all the inter-
governmental agencies are to undertake? In placing such heavy
expectations on the poor people and the poor countries of the
world, are we in effect blaming the victim?
The Task Force summarized its proposed strategy as follows:
1. Mobilize political action to end hunger-at the global scale
as well as at the national and local scales, in rich and poor
countries.
2. Align national policies that restore budgetary priority to
agriculture as the engine of economic growth, build rural infra-
structure, empower women, and build human capacity in all sec-
tors involved in hunger-reduction actions.
3. Implement and scale-up proven actions that improve the nutri-
tion of vulnerable groups, raise agricultural productivity in
smallholder farms and improve market functions-in ways that cre-
ate synergies and result in positive transformations.
This points in good directions, but does it qualify as a strat-
egy?
The Hunger Task Force's approach was to make a list of the many
different types of action that could be considered, and then of-
fer "Guidelines for Selecting Among Candidate Actions". It is
not always clear who is to take the selected actions, what is to
motivate those who are required to take action, and what agency
is to coordinate the separate actions so that they come together
to form a cogent program.
The Task Force's approach hints at some of the resources that
might be used, but it does not tell us how they are to be pulled
together. If ending hunger in the long term is a serious objec-
tive, and if reducing the proportion of hungry people by half by
2015 is to be taken as a serious intermediate target, then there
is a need to prepare a detailed plan, something like the plan
one would need to build a bridge across a river. We would need
to establish a clear vision of the thing we intend to build, we
would need a commitment of resources of many different kinds,
and we would need to formulate a detailed workplan, a series of
steps that would transform piles of resources into that bridge.
That plan could not take the form of a simple list: do A, then
B, then C, etc. There would have to be a primary contractor, and
several subcontractors. The various contracts would have to an-
ticipate that some subcontractors might would not perform up to
expectations, materials would sometimes arrive late, some work-
ers would call in sick or go out on strike. Nevertheless, the
task is not to deliver excuses, but to get the job done, no mat-
ter what. We know that we could not simply launch the plan and
go away. We would have to stay on it, constantly steering the
job toward its completion.
Of course, the task of ending hunger and malnutrition is not
like building a bridge. While our proposed bridge might be new
and unique in many ways, the fact is that many other bridges
have been built in the past, and there is a lot that can be
learned from past successes, and also past failures. Ending mal-
nutrition, however, is an entirely new sort of challenge, one
that requires tools and approaches that have never before been
imagined. In some respects the challenge is comparable to Presi-
dent John Kennedy's call in the early 1960s to send men to the
moon. He had no idea how the job would get done, but he was able
to provide the vision.
While the challenge of ending hunger and malnutrition is unique,
like the call to send men to the moon, there are important dif-
ferences. President Kennedy was able to supply not only the vi-
sion, but also the resources. And he was able to provide an au-
thority structure through which contractors and subcontractors
could be hired and paid and asked to do the bidding of the
United States government. The task of ending hunger in the world
is far more difficult. The vision has to be so compelling and so
complete that it must include finding ways to muster the re-
quired resources, and it must include the creation of an organ-
izational structure adequate to meet the requirements of the
job.
The major missing piece in the Hunger Task Force's report is the
vision. If we are to end malnutrition in the world, we need to
sketch out how that world would work. How should social and eco-
nomic forces be reconfigured so that the world no longer repro-
duces poverty and hunger? We need a mental picture of that world
if we are ever going to build it.
There is a need to formulate a vision together with a plan that
we confidently believe will get the job done. It must be articu-
lated with enough clarity to inspire commitment and action, just
as the early visions of the great cathedrals inspired genera-
tions of people to commit themselves to the fulfillment of the
original vision.
If we were serious about ending malnutrition in the world, we
would need many things, such as:
* A clear vision of what is to be created;
* Some way to know when the job is done;
* A workplan that would take us to completion;
* A series of steps to assure the completion of each part of the
plan;
* Clarity about who needs to do what to get the job done;
* Clarity about the incentives that would induce the people who
need to act to take the actions required of them;
* Contingency plans and a system of mid-course corrections to
deal with every sort of obstacle.
Bridges don't get built through wishful thinking, and neither
will the ending of hunger. Any serious plan to end hunger should
include elements such as these. If it is to fulfill its mandate,
the Millennium Task Force on Hunger should give us a picture of
what is to be built, and a detailed program of specific actions
that would lead us to confidently expect that hunger will in
fact be reduced by half by 2015.
The most discouraging thing about the Task Force is not in the
content of its documents, but in the fact that the Task Force
itself will be disbanded soon after it submits its final report.
What will happen then? Who will be in charge? Who will see this
project through to completion? Will we have here a situation in
which the architects drop their blueprints on the table, and
then they and everyone else goes home?
We need to take the concept of strategy much more seriously, and
work out the means for getting to the goal. If the task of
strategizing is not taken more seriously, the Millennium Project
Hunger Task Force could simply elevate the level of disappoint-
ment and disillusionment for the poor and hungry of the world.
Perhaps the work of the Hunger Task Force so far should be un-
derstood as a prelude, only the beginning of the work that needs
to be done to formulate the vision and the commitment and the
planning that are required if the project of ending hunger and
malnutrition is to succeed. Who will carry that work forward?
--
REFERENCE
Millennium Project Hunger Task Force. 2003. Halving Hunger by
2015: A Framework for Action, Interim Report of the Millennium
Project Hunger Task Force. New York: Millennium Project.
http://www.earthinstitute.Columbia.edu/tropag/documents/Hunger_InterimReport020204.pdf